CSP tells browsers which origins may run scripts, load styles, embed frames, etc. It is a strong second line of defense after escaping output.
Basic directive shape
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data: https:; style-src 'self'
Scripts without inline eval
- Avoid
'unsafe-inline'inscript-srcin production. - Use nonce per response on
<script>tags:script-src 'nonce-{random}'. - Or sha256 hashes for tiny inline snippets.
Clickjacking
frame-ancestors 'none' or allowlist parents instead of legacy X-Frame-Options alone.
Rollout
Start with Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only and collect violations before enforcing.
Common pain
Third-party analytics/widgets require explicit allowlists; inline event handlers (onclick=) violate strict CSP — refactor to JS files.